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The fundamentals of emerging market economies (EMEs) have improved signiﬁ  cantly over the past few 
years and their integration into the global economy and international ﬁ  nancial markets has strengthened. 
In 2005, net inﬂ  ows of foreign private capital to EMEs reached a record level of USD 400 billion. Outstandings 
of government securities issued by EMEs on international markets increased six-fold between 1994 and 
2005, rising from less than USD 50 billion to over USD 300 billion. Over the same period, their bank loan 
outstandings were more than halved, falling from USD 250 billion to USD 100 billion.
This considerable surge in market ﬁ  nancing has been underpinned by substantial efforts to modernise the 
ﬁ  nancial sector, which has enabled EMEs to offer investors an increasingly wide and sophisticated range of 
ﬁ  nancial instruments and thus to attract new types of investors. Overall, EMEs are tending to put in place 
ﬁ  nancial structures similar to those in advanced countries (1|).
At the same time, several recent indices suggest that investors no longer necessarily regard emerging 
assets as a homogenous bloc in their portfolio choices. Their wariness vis-à-vis these markets and their 
attendant risks appears to be shifting towards greater discrimination between EMEs on the basis of their 
speciﬁ  c characteristics, or the type of ﬁ  nancial instrument offered (2|).
Nevertheless, these trends do not prevent emerging markets from being subject to occasional disruptions, 
especially if the economic and ﬁ  nancial environment were to become less favourable. The narrowness of 
these markets, the dependence on the decisions of non-resident investors, and the low level of risk premia 
maintain uncertainty as to their reaction in the event of large-scale unforeseen shocks (3|).
Against this backdrop, market participants are justiﬁ  ed in basing their investment and ﬁ  nancing decisions 
on a range of criteria assessed over the whole economic cycle.ARTICLES
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1| AT COUNTRY LEVEL
CONVERGENCE AND FINANCIAL
MARKET DEVELOPMENT
Over the past few years, the macroeconomic 
performance of most EMEs has improved 
signiﬁ   cantly. The room for manoeuvre thus 
created has been used to undertake major efforts to 
modernise the ﬁ  nancial sector, which have tended to 
bring the ﬁ  nancial structures of EMEs more in line 
with those of advanced countries in various respects: 
composition of public debt; range of ﬁ  nancial 
markets; types of investors.
1|1  Improvement in the structure 
  of public debt
Public debt-to-GDP ratios have tended to fall over the 
past 15 years, notably as a result of more restrictive 
ﬁ  scal policies, at least during a number of years, 
under pressure from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) or other multilateral institutions. 
In  some cases, revenues from privatisations or 
exports of commodities have been used to repay 
public debt.
At the same time, since the mid-1990s, the ﬁ  nancing 
of emerging sovereigns has increasingly taken the 
form of securities issuance and less and less that of 
syndicated loans extended by banks.
In the long run, the aim of these countries would 
be to comply with OECD best practices, which 
recommend ﬁ  nancing in the form of ﬁ  xed rate, 
long-term local currency denominated debt 
underpinned by a broad base of domestic investors. 
Accordingly, the share of long-term issues has 
increased, the government securities market now 
comprises a wider range of maturities, and the 
average maturity of debt may be lengthened still 
further.
Over the recent period, a trend towards the issuance 
of inﬂ   ation-indexed bonds has been observed, 
which often allows countries that have experienced 
episodes of high inﬂ  ation to issue longer-term debt. 
In addition, this debt is increasingly ﬁ  xed rate, even 
if variable rate public debt remains predominant in 
some cases. 
Lastly, public debt is more often issued in domestic 
currency, which reduces currency mismatches 
and makes sovereign solvency less dependent on 
exchange rate ﬂ  uctuations.
Overall, according to an IMF estimate at the end 
of 2004,1 foreign currency denominated debt now 
only accounts for an average 16% of EMEs’ negotiable 
public debt (compared with 6% in OECD countries) 
and short-term debt for 11% (compared with 16% 
in the OECD). 
A number of countries are particularly illustrative 
with respect to these developments. In Mexico, since 
the crisis in 1994, the share of long-term public debt 
has grown (from 62% of total public debt in 1996 to 
77% in 2005) as has that of ﬁ  xed rate public debt 
(from 5% in 2000 to 40% in 2005). In  addition, 
the share of foreign currency denominated debt 
has fallen signiﬁ  cantly (from 73% in 1996 to 32% 
in 2005), thanks to the use of innovative asset 
and liability management techniques such as the 
warrants issued in November 2005, which enabled 
dollar-denominated debt to be converted into pesos.
Chart 1
Public debt
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Source: IMF (Global Financial Stability Review).
1  On a sample of 18 EMEs representing 90% of the capitalisation of the EMBIG bond index.ARTICLES
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Other countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, 
Turkey and Panama have decided to repay all or 
part of their external foreign currency denominated 
debt in the form of Brady bonds or more generally 
debts to the Paris Club, thereby reducing their 
debt-servicing by a corresponding amount.
Combined with the often very large-scale accumulation 
of foreign currency reserves, efforts to consolidate 
public ﬁ  nances have resulted in an improvement in 
the ratings of sovereign bonds, enabling a return to 
levels seen before the Asian crisis in 1997. This trend 
has continued more recently. It undoubtedly reﬂ  ects 
an improvement in the quality of EME public debt. 
The risk premia on emerging bonds thus fell up to 
early 2006 to reach historical lows. 
1|2  Broadening of the range 
 of  ﬁ  nancial markets
The types of public and private ﬁ  nancing in EMEs 
have also increased, with a broadening of the range 
of ﬁ  nancial markets, alongside growth in ﬁ  nancing 
raised on markets, notably in local currency.
In response to the banking crises during 
the 1997-2001 period, the structural reforms 
implemented have allowed banking sectors to be 
restructured and consolidated, ﬁ  nancial systems to 
be opened up to foreign investors and supervision 
to be reinforced.
In parallel, the share of market ﬁ  nance has increased 
via the emergence of new ﬁ  nancial instruments. 
Not only has there been growth in local currency 
denominated sovereign bond issuance (see above), 
but also, to a lesser extent, in private sector 
bond issuance, notably by ﬁ  nancial institutions. 
Moreover, domestic stock exchanges have played 
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Chart 3
Rating of foreign currency denominated sovereign debt










Source: Simple average of S&P and  Moody’s ratings.
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1|3 Diversiﬁ  cation of investors
In this favourable climate, since 2002, international 
investors have turned back to emerging assets, having 
tended to shun them after the ﬁ  nancial crises of 
the 1990s. Portfolio investment ﬂ  ows by non-residents 
into EMEs now exceed the amounts reached before 
the Asian ﬁ  nancial crisis in 1997. The globalisation of 
ﬁ  nancial markets and investment strategies together 
with the concern to diversify portfolios have also 
contributed to this trend.
The low level of interest rates over the past four 
years has also encouraged institutional investors 
in developed economies (insurance companies, 
pension funds, mutual funds, etc.) to position 
themselves on emerging markets with a view to 
garnering additional yield enabling them to meet 
their commitments. 
While it is not possible to measure their precise 
impact,2 all of these factors have probably encouraged 
the arrival on ﬁ  nancial markets of players whose 
behaviour is more stable and who are likely to hold 
securities for longer periods. For example, the largest 
US public pension fund, Calpers, has increased its 
share of emerging assets in the funds under its 
management from 0.6% to 2.3% between 2002 and 
end-2005. The proportion of EME equities in the 
portfolio of the Swedish public pension fund AP2 
rose from 3% to 5% in early 2006.
Regarded as more volatile, the investment ﬂ  ows of 
mutual funds specialising in EMEs also recorded very 
strong growth between 2002 and 2006, even if they 
only account for 1.5% of funds under management 
in the United States.
Lastly, the participation of hedge funds specialising 
in emerging markets has increased both in terms of 
their number and the amounts invested. According 
to The Barclays Group, quoted by IXIS (2006), 
outstandings managed by hedge funds specialising 
in emerging markets have grown twice as fast as total 
hedge fund outstandings, rising from 6% of the total 
in 2002 to over 12% in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2006.
The geographical origin of investors participating 
in EMEs has also diversiﬁ  ed. According to the IMF 
(2006), investors from Asia and the Middle East 
have begun to allocate part of their portfolios to 
assets from other EMEs, which appears to be a new 
phenomenon. In particular, central banks are, in a 
limited manner, taking part in this movement, thus 
seeking to diversify their reserves and to increase 
their returns. Regional initiatives, such as the Asian 
Bond Fund, are likely to contribute to this. Financed 
by the foreign currency reserves of the Asia-Paciﬁ  c 
central banks, the Asian Bond Funds 1 and 2 
(ABF1 and ABF2) were set up in 2003 and 2004. 
These funds are designed to invest in sovereign and 
quasi-sovereign bonds issued by eight members of 
the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia Paciﬁ  c Central 
Chart 5
Portfolio investment ﬂ  ows to EMEs
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Source: Institute for International Finance (IIF); Banque de France calculations.
2  In the absence of comprehensive detailed data on holdings of EME bonds.
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Banks (EMEAP) denominated in US dollars in the 
case of the ABF1 and in local currencies for the 
ABF2.3
This development was made possible by the partial 
lifting of barriers to investment by non-residents, 
in particular ﬁ  scal ones, an easing of regulations and 
the beginnings of an improvement in transparency, 
which in some countries (such as Brazil) appears to 
have triggered a virtuous spiral between increasing 
investment from non-residents and the acceleration 
of domestic reforms.4
However, in order to meet their ﬁ  nancing 
requirements, EMEs still need to develop a base 
of domestic institutional investors, such as mutual 
funds, insurance companies and pension funds that 
is sufﬁ  ciently broad to signiﬁ  cantly and durably 
reduce their external vulnerability. In  some 
countries, this development is already under way, 
in part due to the introduction of pension systems 
based on capitalisation, such as in Chile, where 
pension fund assets represent 56% of GDP, or 
Mexico, where private pension funds, which were 
introduced in 1997, hold USD 50 billion worth of 
peso-denominated government bonds.
2| AT INVESTOR LEVEL:
GREATER DISCRIMINATION
BETWEEN COUNTRIES
The overall improvement in the fundamentals of 
EMEs masks a great dispersion regarding most of the 
benchmark indicators (notably GDP growth, inﬂ  ation, 
balance of payments, foreign currency reserves and 
public ﬁ   nances). Thus, assessing emerging risk 
entails taking account of the speciﬁ  c situation in 
each emerging region, or even each country.
2|1  A diversity of situations…
The trend towards the consolidation of public 
ﬁ  nances and the improvement of the macroeconomic 
environment in EMEs should not lead to a hasty 
assessment of the resilience of their ﬁ  nancial 
systems. In reality, ﬁ  nancial stability should be 
gauged against a set of variables that require 
constant monitoring on the part of the competent 
authorities and that vary depending on the country 
or geographical region in question. A non-exhaustive 
list of these would be: 
• non-performing loans;
• GDP growth;
• the current account balance;
• the level of foreign currency reserves.
Qualitative aspects should not be overlooked either, 
notably the quality of governance and banking 
supervision and the effectiveness of risk assessment 
systems put in place by ﬁ  nancial institutions.
This multicriteria approach is all the more necessary 
given that EMEs exhibit very diverse characteristics 
to investors, whether in terms of country size, the 
size of bond markets, energy dependence, the level of 
foreign currency reserves, sovereign debt ratings or, 
more generally, macroeconomic performances. Thus, 
not all EMEs display the same degree of exposure 
to hazards likely to affect the development of the 
global economy. For example, further interest rate 
rises could bring about a widening of emerging 
spreads along with a decline in foreign private 
capital inﬂ  ows and would particularly affect the 
most-indebted countries. If energy prices continue to 
rise, this would have a greater impact on the domestic 
demand of economies that have an energy deﬁ  cit. 
A slowdown in the US economy would particularly 
undermine those EMEs whose growth is strongly 
dependent on exports to the United States while 
their domestic demand is weak. The persistence 
of large ﬁ  scal imbalances in some EMEs is also a 
speciﬁ  c source of vulnerability for those countries. 
2|2 …increasingly  reﬂ  ected 
 in  valuations
As the share of EME assets in their portfolios 
increases, investors are encouraged to develop and 
reﬁ  ne their analysis of idiosyncratic valuation factors 
speciﬁ  c to each market and country. In this respect, 
the correction that occurred on ﬁ  nancial markets 
3  See Guérin and Sa (2006).
4  See Banque de France (2006), “Proactive debt management in emerging countries: the case of Brazil», Financial Stability Review, No. 8, May, Box 3, p. 25.ARTICLES
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in May 2006, including on emerging markets, might 
be a sign that investors have stopped assessing 
emerging risk in a uniform fashion irrespective of 
the region concerned, unlike the trend witnessed 
in the 1990s.
First, the relative stability displayed by EME credit 
risk premia while stock prices were falling sharply 
and their volatility was increasing showed bond 
markets’ autonomy vis-à-vis stock markets.
Second, the correction affected most EME stock 
markets negatively, but to varying degrees 
depending on their fundamentals. Indeed, the 
correction affected countries that are most fragile 
in macroeconomic terms more markedly, which 
seems to conﬁ  rm the start of a more reﬁ  ned and 
discriminating analysis of markets by investors. 
In the European zone, the impact was felt above all 
on the Turkish and Hungarian markets and there 
was no regional contagion, for example to other 
emerging European countries. 
Lastly, investors appear to have taken particular 
account of the determinants that speciﬁ  cally underlie 
the valuation of local equity markets. Thus, the 
emerging stock markets that had risen most during 
the previous year but where valuations appeared 
the most uncertain recorded the largest falls 
(e.g. the Middle East). Meanwhile, other stock 
markets such China’s continued to grow. 
All in all, by enabling investors to better manage 
their risks, enhanced market transparency probably 
fostered this differentiated reaction.
3| FACTORS OF VULNERABILITY
IN THE EVENT OF SHOCKS
3|1 Narrow  ﬁ  nancial markets 
In spite of the progress made over the past few 
years, ﬁ   nancial markets in EMEs still display 
some shortcomings linked to different kinds of 
factors: lack of domestic institutional investors; 
difﬁ   culty in channelling household savings in 
economies where the banking sector is often very 
underdeveloped; regulatory constraints; continuing 
limited transparency; governance mechanisms that 
provide little protection. 
In particular, corporate bond markets in these 
countries remain small as a percentage of national 
income, but also in comparison to stock markets. 
Chart 7
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Chart 8
Variation in EME stock markets and exchange rates 
between 1 May and 30 June 2006
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They are based on young structures, which do not 
yet satisfy all of the requirements already in place 
in advanced economies, in particular: 
• the creation of a benchmark liquid bond yield 
curve, notably by establishing the role of market 
maker; 
• smoothly functioning market infrastructures;
•  the presence of a sufﬁ   ciently broad base of 
domestic institutional investors; 
• genuine opening up to non-resident investors.
This explains the low liquidity of many emerging 
markets (measured by the relation between 
transaction ﬂ  ows and outstandings held), which can 
lead to sharp ﬂ  uctuations in the volatility of EME 
asset prices in the event of even slight portfolio 
reallocations by international investors.
Moreover, access to local currency denominated 
assets exposes foreign institutional investors 
not only to interest rate and credit risk, but also 
exchange rate risk. Their losses could therefore 
multiply when episodes of tension lead them to 
simultaneously revise their positions on all asset 
classes in one country or region, as was the case on 
Turkish markets in May 2006.
3|2  Growth in foreign currency
  denominated private debt
Emerging sovereigns’ currency mismatches have 
tended to diminish (see 1|1 above). However, 
those pertaining to the private sector (companies, 
households) have grown in some countries, reﬂ  ecting 
the ﬁ  nancial deepening of the economy. This may 
raise questions about the effects of the “euroisation” 
of household credit in new European Union 
Member States. In Poland, for example, the share 
of loans denominated in foreign currencies (euro, 
Swiss franc) in total housing loans stood at 75% 
in March 2006, of which a large proportion were 
variable rate loans. 
The borrowing households in question may 
consider that, in the future they will have natural 
protection from exchange rate risk given that they 
are borrowing at a much longer time horizon than 
the date by which they expect their country to join 
the euro area. However, pending this hypothetical 
entry into the euro area, they remain highly 
exposed to exchange rate risk, with their foreign 
currency denominated assets (net of their liabilities) 
having been strongly negative since end-2004. 
This development could lead to ﬁ  nancial difﬁ  culties 
given that it is likely to increase borrowers’ 
probability of default.
Chart 9
Size of ﬁ  nancial markets
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Chart 10
Foreign currency denominated household credit 
in emerging Europe in 2005














Do emerging market economies still constitute a homogenous asset class?
46  Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 9 • December 2006
A detailed analysis covering several Central and 
Eastern European countries would probably be 
necessary to assess the overall magnitude of the 
risks linked to foreign currency denominated 
household debt.
3|3  More complex distribution of risk
The development of credit risk transfer mechanisms 
facilitates the holding of EME assets. However, these 
mechanisms increase uncertainty regarding the 
actual risk holders and developments on emerging 
markets during periods of stress. They might also 
complicate further processes for restructuring 
sovereign debt.5 Thus, if certain emerging sovereigns 
defaulted in the current environment, their creditors 
would not necessarily bear the credit risk on account 
of the use of derivatives and might therefore have 
less incentive to reach an agreement rapidly.
Moreover, while the growing participation of 
hedge funds on emerging markets appears to have 
increased their liquidity, it could also complicate 
the assessment of risk. Indeed, these funds, some 
of which employ leverage (between 20% and 50% 
of hedge funds specialising in emerging markets, 
according to Tremont Capital Management), may 
be obliged to rapidly unwind their positions in the 
event of difﬁ  culty in satisfying margin calls or other 
ﬁ  nancial obligations.6 Certain factors may also lead 
them to underestimate market risk: insufﬁ  cient 
country diversiﬁ  cation, misjudgement as to their 
ability to unwind their positions at reasonable prices, 
especially since several hedge funds may have the 
same positions (crowded trades).
3|4  A potential upside pressure 
  on risk premia
Risk premia on emerging bond markets have 
fallen signiﬁ  cantly over the past three years, with 
JP Morgan’s benchmark EMBIG index dropping 
from over 1200 basis points in November  2001 
to around 200 basis points in autumn 2006. How 
should this narrowing of risk premia be interpreted?7
Is it linked to the improvement in the economic 
fundamentals (“pull factors”) or to external factors 
such as the abundance of liquidity at a global 
level and a decline in international investors’ risk 
aversion8 (“push factors”)? If the fall in risk premia 
were not caused by sound fundamentals but 
rather were explained by exogenous factors linked 
to international ﬁ  nancial conditions, the future 
of cheap capital ﬂ  ows would not be guaranteed. 
In this regard, recent empirical studies carried out 
by the Bank of England (2005) and Goldman Sachs 
(2005) encourage caution as they show that “push” 
factors appear to have played a signiﬁ  cant role in 
the narrowing of risk premia. The Bank of England 
indicates that economic fundamentals explain less 
than 20% of the fall between January 2001 and 
end-2005 while Goldman Sachs attributes 45% of 
the narrowing of spreads to risk aversion.
As a result, we may assume that a tightening of 
monetary policies would probably be accompanied 
by greater investor risk aversion and contribute to 
increasing risk premia.
5  Bearing in mind that these have already had to take account of the increasing disintermediation of ﬁ  nancing, with, notably, the introduction of collective action 
clauses (CAC), see Weber (2005).
6  See ECB (2006).
7  We may also question the relevance of conventional measures of these premia, such as yield spreads between issuers, given that benchmark issuers 
(United States, Germany) have appeared less than virtuous over the past few years. Other indicators such as swap spreads or CDS premia are already used by 
market participants.
8  See Coudert and Gex (2006).
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In EMEs, the 1990s were characterised by the proliferation of crises of investor conﬁ  dence, their rapid 
spread between economic sectors and countries and, as a consequence, erratic capital movements and 
exchange rate ﬂ  uctuations.
By contrast, over the more recent period, the spillover of economic and ﬁ  nancial shocks has been limited, 
as in the case of Argentina’s default in 2001, even though the trade and ﬁ  nancial integration of EMEs into 
the global economy has increased signiﬁ  cantly.
Indeed, EMEs have undertaken substantial efforts to consolidate and modernise their ﬁ  nancial sectors, 
which in part explains their strong economic growth and the fall in their ﬁ  nancing costs. Their ﬁ  nancial 
systems have also moved more in line with those in advanced economies. In addition, market participants 
appear to be seeking to better discriminate between EMEs on the basis on their speciﬁ  c situations. 
Lastly, it is possible that these countries have improved their capacity to prevent crises. Nonetheless, it is 
probable that this nascent immunity to shocks has been fostered by an extremely favourable economic 
and ﬁ  nancial environment.
The recent nature of these developments should therefore caution us against concluding that contagion 
mechanisms have disappeared and encourage us to remain prudent in the presence of several factors 
of vulnerability: insufﬁ  cient size and liquidity of markets, a still narrow domestic investor base, strong 
dependence on decisions of international investors, and a large exposure to exchange rate and credit risk. 
Thus, periods of sudden ﬂ  uctuations in the price volatility of EME assets cannot be excluded, particularly 
in the event of an unforeseen large-scale shock. The current low level of risk premia reduces the protection 
afforded to investors, whereas the presence of global operators that are creditors vis-à-vis several EMEs 
simultaneously may constitute an additional factor in the propagation of shocks.
Against this backdrop, it is legitimate that investors and creditors pay greater attention over the medium term 
not only to the fundamental macroeconomic variables but also to the quality of ﬁ  nancial structures, 
in order to base their investment and ﬁ  nancing decisions on a multicriteria approach (supervision, regulation, 
transparency and infrastructure).ARTICLES
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